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Research on UN peacekeeping operations has established that mission size and composition 
affect peacekeeping success. However, we lack systematic data for evaluating whether 
variation in tasks assigned to UN peacekeeping mandates matters and what explains different 
configurations of mandated tasks in the first place. Drawing on UN Security Council 
resolutions that establish or revise mandates of 27 UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in 
the 1991-2017 period, the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset can fill this gap. It records 
39 distinct tasks, ranging from disarmament to reconciliation and electoral support. For each 
task, the PEMA dataset also distinguishes between three modalities of engagement 
(monitoring, assisting, and securing) and whether the task is requested or merely encouraged. 
To illustrate the usefulness of our data, we re-examine Hultman et al.’s (2013) analysis of 
missions’ ability to protect civilians. Our results show that host governments and rebel groups 
respond differently to civilian protection mandates.  
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UN peacekeeping has become a central instrument of international conflict resolution. From 
its Cold War focus on ceasefire monitoring in interstate conflicts, peacekeeping has evolved to 
become increasingly ambitious. Contemporary peacekeeping operations are asked to undertake 
a wide variety of different tasks, such as establishing security, supervising elections, reforming 
security sector institutions, and reconciling communities. While the growing importance of 
peacekeeping is usually highlighted using the number of deployed troops (95,500 in 2020), 
costs ($6.51 billion in 2019-2020), or fatalities (132 in 2019), the role and character of 
peacekeeping operations are ultimately defined by their mandates.  
 
Since mandates regulate what peacekeepers are expected to do, they shape the ability of UN 
missions to manage conflict and assist governments and populations of conflict-affected 
countries (Blair et al. 2020). For example, in line with their mandate to protect civilians, 
peacekeepers in South Sudan guarded several sites sheltering those displaced by violence, the 
largest of which equaled the city of Bern in population. The current mission in Mali, among 
other tasks, included strong gender mainstreaming language in its mandate and worked on 
issues ranging from sexual and gender-based violence to women’s participation in civil society.  
 
Moreover, peacekeeping mandates may not only affect what peacekeepers can achieve, but 
also reflect the evolution of international norms. Peacekeeping mandates are the result of a 
complex decision-making process involving the members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), 
the UN Secretariat, and the parties to the conflict. Debates on concrete peacekeeping tasks 
often reveal deep-seated disagreements about international community’s operational and 
normative priorities. For instance, by the end of the 1990s, only one mission had a mandate to 
protect civilians (the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone). Over the past two decades, the 
mandates of UN peacekeeping operations reveal that civilian protection has become a 
manifestation of international norms of human security and responsibility to protect. More than 
ninety-five percent of today’s peacekeeping mandates include civilian protection tasks.5  
 
Beyond these examples, however, comprehensive cross-national and time-varying data on 
tasks in UN peacekeeping mandates are not yet available. As a result, researchers have made 
assumptions about mandate homogeneity, relied on simplified proxy measures, or overlooked 
 
5 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/protecting-civilians. Accessed November 2020. 
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mandates completely. To rectify this situation, this article introduces the Peacekeeping 
Mandates (PEMA) dataset covering all UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 1991-
2017 period. The PEMA dataset provides systematic, human-coded data on a comprehensive 
set of peacekeeping tasks that are mandated by UNSC resolutions.   
 
The PEMA dataset extends existing data collections on peacekeeping mandates in three 
important ways. First, the PEMA dataset captures the evolution of mandated tasks over the full 
lifespan of a peacekeeping operation. Existing data sources focus on initial mandates and do 
not cover mandate modification once the peacekeepers deploy (Mullenbach 2017; Diehl & 
Druckman 2018; Benson & Tucker 2019; Clayton et al. 2020). Second, it records a more 
complete set of mandated tasks than existing data collections. The largest number of distinct 
peacekeeping-specific tasks (11 tasks) is currently found in a dataset by Diehl and Druckman 
(2018).6 By contrast, the PEMA dataset offers information on 39 tasks. For instance, the PEMA 
dataset splits the task of “promoting rule of law/civil society” recorded by Diehl and Druckman 
into 7 tasks, namely (i) police reform, (ii) military reform, (iii) justice sector reform, (iv) 
transitional justice, (v) prison reform, (vi) civil society; and (vii) media. Finally, the PEMA 
dataset is the first one to capture the modality of peacekeepers’ engagement (monitoring, 
assisting, or providing security) for each task. For instance, PEMA distinguishes whether 
peacekeepers are mandated to merely monitor elections, assist with their organization, or 
provide electoral security.  
 
A panel dataset of peacekeeping tasks is long overdue. It will help advance scholarship on UN 
peacekeeping and international politics in two principal ways. First, the PEMA dataset provides 
a vital addition to quantitative studies on peacekeeping, which have so far focused on the 
number of uniformed personnel, such as troops and police (e.g., Hultman et al. 2013, 2019), 
mission composition (e.g., Karim and Beardsley 2017; Bove et al. 2020; Belgioioso et al. 
2020), and subnational geographic deployment of peacekeepers (e.g., Ruggeri et al. 2017; 
Fjelde et al. 2019; Phayal and Prins 2020). However, even a large peacekeeping force may 
have little impact if it does not have the mandate to proactively ensure stability and assist 
national institutions with conflict mitigation, political transition, and good governance. We 
argue and show in our replication of the analysis by Hultman et al. (2013) that, beyond 
personnel numbers, mandated tasks can also influence the effectiveness of peacekeeping 
 
6 Unfortunately, the dataset by Diehl and Druckman (2017) is not publicly available. 
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operations in important ways. Thus, scholars interested in peacekeeping as a tool of conflict 
resolution may find our data valuable for their work. Second, the PEMA dataset sets the stage 
for several new research avenues on international organizations, foreign policy, and 
multilateral negotiations. Since UNSC members negotiate over each task that is included in 
new and revised peacekeeping mandates, with input by the UN Secretariat and under pressure 
from civil society, the PEMA dataset will be of interest to those who study those negotiations 
from a variety of perspectives. 
 
The rest of this article has five parts. In the first section, we explain why peacekeeping 
mandates are important by describing how they are negotiated and connected to global political 
processes. In the second section, we review existing qualitative and quantitative research on 
peacekeeping mandates, demonstrating that no comprehensive dataset of mandated tasks 
exists. In the third section, we present the PEMA dataset, including the variables, sources, and 
main coding procedures. In the fourth section, we provide an overview of descriptive patterns 
in the data. In the fifth section, we discuss two major research avenues that the PEMA dataset 
opens. In the sixth section, to illustrate the usefulness of PEMA, we replicate and extend 
Hultman et al.’s (2013) study of UN peacekeepers’ ability to reduce violence against civilians, 
showing that mandates matter and have different implications for governments and rebels 
perpetrating violence against civilians. We conclude by discussing how ongoing and future 
research can further benefit from the PEMA dataset. 
 
Why Study UN Peacekeeping Mandates? 
The UNSC negotiates peacekeeping mandates, which specify the duration and tasks of 
peacekeeping operations. In addition to the initial mandate, the Council regularly issues 
resolutions either to extend a peacekeeping mission’s mandate or to authorize the mission’s 
withdrawal. Extensions are frequently accompanied by mandate revisions to include new tasks 
and discontinue old ones. The mandate serves as a framework for peacekeepers’ activities on 
the ground. Although UN officials and commanders have some scope for interpreting their 
mandates (Karlsrud 2013), Security Council resolutions serve as the legal basis for their 
actions. They also represent an expression of the Council’s resolve, providing an important 
resource for peacekeeping missions relying on the international community’s political support 
in engaging with national authorities and rebel groups. 
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The three decades of post-Cold-War peacekeeping witnessed several cycles of expansion and 
contraction. Presently, peacekeeping mandates have become so complex that they have been 
compared to “Christmas trees” which various actors seek to “adorn” with their preferred 
provisions (Oksamytna and Lundgren 2020).7 In parallel, negotiations on both revised and new 
mandates became increasingly contentious in the late 2010s. Russia and China started 
questioning liberal provisions in peacekeeping resolutions, for example, by resisting aspects of 
the women, peace and security agenda (Security Council Report 2017). Western states also 
downscaled peacekeeping ambitions from nation-building, democratization, and reconciliation 
to focus on narrower priorities, such as stabilization (Karlsrud 2019; Hunt and Curran 2020). 
Peacekeeping mandate negotiations offer a window into normative priorities of the 
international society as well as power dynamics within it. 
 
The substantive content of peacekeeping mandates has crucial implications for a wide variety 
of stakeholders. First, mandates affect UN peacekeeping missions themselves and particularly 
their resources. Although their budgets are decided in the UN General Assembly’s committees, 
the tasks outlined in UNSC mandates broadly shape the size and composition of their 
uniformed and civilian components. For example, the inclusion of a mandated task on 
protection of civilians (POC) has implications for the force generation process, which in this 
case should prioritize personnel trained and equipped to patrol, liaise with the local population, 
and gather intelligence in order to be able to prevent, preempt, or stop civilian victimization. 
Mandates also affect countries’ willingness to contribute troops to specific missions. For 
example, Brazil prefers participating in operations with tasks that focus on reconstruction and 
development (Da Fontoura and Uziel 2017).  
 
Second, peacekeeping mandates affect countries where missions are deployed. They determine 
the types of assurance and assistance that peacekeepers can offer to the host government, rebel 
groups, neighboring countries, and the local population (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Mandates 
are consequential for peacekeeping success. For instance, research shows that traditional and 
monitoring missions are less effective in reducing the risk of war recurrence than missions with 
a multidimensional mandate that tasks peacekeepers to engage in peace- and state-building 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2006). This research suggests that mandate design is an 
important factor to consider when evaluating the effectiveness of multidimensional operations, 
 
7 Attempts to reign in this tendency in the second half of the 2010s were met with limited success. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3703503
5 
 
and its findings call for more research on how variation in the prevalence of specific tasks 
within multidimensional mandates shape conflict resolution success or failure. 
 
Third, mandates affect peacekeeping missions’ partners. For example, humanitarian and 
development NGOs have expressed concerns that peacekeepers who are tasked to assist 
refugees or protect children encroach on the formers’ policy domain and threaten the 
independence of humanitarian action (Marín 2017). Moreover, research suggests that mandates 
to use offensive force have endangered activities of local civil society actors and international 
NGOs that partner with peacekeepers (e.g., Karlsrud 2015, 45). As such, what peacekeepers 
are mandated to do influences relationships between the various international actors engaged 
in conflict-affected countries. 
 
Overall, systematic, empirical analysis of mandates is necessary and timely. The PEMA dataset 
allows researchers to investigate the design of peacekeeping mandates and how variation in 
mandates affects peacekeeping outcomes. It also illuminates the broad changes in 
peacekeeping politics caused by normative and power shifts in the Security Council. In the 
following section, we review the state of the peacekeeping literature and the steps taken in the 
direction of studying mandates and their variation. 
 
Existing Data on Peacekeeping Mandates  
Both qualitative and quantitative studies have collected information on UN peacekeeping 
mandates. Yet, as we show below, existing datasets leave important gaps in our knowledge: (i) 
they are incomplete in terms of the increasingly wide variety of mandated tasks; (ii) they do 
not systematically capture whether peacekeepers are requested to monitor these tasks or 
provide assistance and security; and (iii) they only cover initial mandates and thus fail to 
capture the evolution of tasks over the lifespan of a peacekeeping operation. 
 
Most qualitative studies have focused on in-depth single-mission analyses of 
intergovernmental mandate negotiations, such as on the UN Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (Weinlich 2014) or the UN mission in South Sudan (Dijkstra 2015). However, 
some qualitative studies look at many peacekeeping mandates. For example, the Oxford 
Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Koops et al. 2015) reproduces the 
texts of all initial peacekeeping mandates. Franke and Warnecke (2009) classify mandate 
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provisions into four broad categories: security and public order, socio-economic well-being, 
governance and participation, or justice and reconciliation. However, while these studies have 
collected valuable information on mandated tasks, they have not turned this information into 
data that can be used in quantitative, comparative studies. Moreover, they give a ‘snapshot’ 
view of peacekeeping mandates, focusing on the initial mandates of a mission. 
 
Early quantitative studies have categorized peacekeeping operations into broad mission types, 
i.e. traditional, monitoring, enforcement, and multidimensional missions (Doyle and Sambanis 
2006; Fortna 2008). However, these categories are ambiguous. For example, the difference 
between traditional and monitoring missions has more to do with mission posture than tasks: 
monitoring missions are “typically less well armed (or unarmed) and focused on monitoring 
and reporting,” but traditional missions also “monitor a truce” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 13-
14). At the same time, there is a considerable variation in tasks that multidimensional missions 
perform, which may include electoral support, local-level reconciliation, ex-combatant 
reintegration, and justice reform (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 16). The “multidimensional” 
category calls for additional disaggregation. 
 
More recent quantitative studies have taken further steps to classify peacekeeping mandates 
into more specific functions. Yet, none of these efforts captures the breadth of peacekeepers’ 
tasks as detailed in UNSC resolutions. Clayton et al. (2020) provide a classification of UN 
peace initiatives (UNPI), including peacekeeping missions but also sanctions committees, 
mediators, tribunals, and investigative bodies. The UNPI dataset indicates some of the 
functions that peacekeepers may perform, (e.g. election support or security sector reform). The 
list also includes functions that peacekeeping missions embody (‘peacekeeping’ is one of the 
categories) or do not perform, such as assisting intergovernmental decision-making, fact 
finding, and decolonization. Finally, all functions remain at a high level of aggregation. For 
instance, for security sector reform, the data does not tell us whether peacekeepers only assist 
military reform or also engage with police personnel, the justice sector, and the penitentiary 
system. It should be noted that UNPI focuses on all UN peace initiatives, hence the coding has 
to be broad enough to compare heterogeneous initiatives. While it is a very well-suited source 
to understand UN’s approach to conflict resolution, it does not provide fine-grained 
information on peacekeeping mandates. 
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Benson and Tucker (2019) code seven categories of tasks in initial peacekeeping mandates for 
analyzing UNSC attention to a specific conflict. These tasks are security for civilians or aid 
operations; the protection of women and children; implementation of peace agreements; DDR; 
implementation of ceasefires; implementation of elections; and army and police training. While 
these broad categories fulfill the purpose of their analysis, there are crucial differences within 
each task category. For example, peace agreements usually contain a series of complex 
provisions. Therefore, whether peacekeepers support the implementation of peace agreements 
does not tell us much about what peacekeepers are requested to do on the ground. 
 
Mullenbach (2017) provides an overview of peacekeeping responsibilities in the Third Party 
Peacekeeping Missions dataset, coding six “purposes” of initial mandates of both UN and non-
UN missions: maintaining law and order; monitoring/verifying ceasefires; 
monitoring/verifying disarmament, demobilization of disengagement of combatants; 
protecting/delivering humanitarian assistance; providing security for refugee camps, airports, 
elections, government buildings, and UN facilities; and maintaining buffer zones. While this 
dataset is valuable for understanding the tasks of uniformed personnel, it does not capture the 
peace- and state-building responsibilities of civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations. 
Moreover, important tasks, that researchers may want to analyze separately, are grouped 
together in broad categories. For example, providing security for UN facilities implies 
protecting the mission itself, while providing security for elections or government buildings 
entails a much more substantial contribution to the restoration and extension of legitimate state 
authority. 
 
Finally, Diehl and Druckman (2018) offer the most fine-grained distinction of mission 
functions so far. They record 11 sets of peacekeeping functions, which they label “missions.” 
Table 1 lists their categories of tasks and shows how they compare to the tasks in the PEMA 
dataset. For example, the PEMA dataset disaggregates democracy assistance into activities 
targeted at institutions such as parliaments (democratic institutions), voters (voter education), 
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Table 1. Comparison between Diehl and Druckman (2018) and PEMA. 






Humanitarian Assistance  
Humanitarian Relief 
Refugees and IDPs 
 





Assistance to Political Parties 
 
Preventive Deployment8 N/A 
 
DDR  
Disarmament and Demobilization 
Reintegration 
 
Pacification/Coercive Peacekeeping  
Arms Embargo 
Offensive Operations 
Use of Force 
 
Human Rights Protection/Protect 
Threatened Groups  
Protection of Civilians 
Human Rights 
Children Rights 
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
Gender Mainstreaming 
 
Local Security/Law and Order  Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
 
8 Preventive deployment refers to the timing of the operation, which arrives before hostilities begin, rather than 
its tasks. The only preventive deployment in the UN’s history, in Macedonia, had tasks that could be found in the 
mandates of other operations as well, chiefly border control in the monitoring modality. 





Promoting Rule of Law/Civil Society  
Police Reform 
Military Reform 





















In summary, the PEMA dataset can make three key additions to these existing efforts. First, 
extant works opt for a high degree of aggregation of peacekeeping tasks. This conceals 
important variation between missions and has led to a proliferation of classification schemes 
that are not easily comparable. The PEMA dataset offers highly granular data on specific tasks 
in peacekeeping mandates, developed inductively and closely following UNSC resolution 
texts.  
 
Second, the PEMA dataset unpacks tasks not only in relation to the specific policy domain in 
which peacekeepers are expected to work (e.g., police reform and military reform rather than 
aggregate security sector reforms) but also their level of engagement. As described in detail 
below, we code whether peacekeepers assist, monitor, or provide security. For example, 
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peacekeepers may assist in providing relief to displaced populations, monitor this activity, or 
provide physical protection to actors helping those vulnerable populations.  
 
Third, none of the studies cited above code variation in mandates over time. The PEMA dataset 
records not only tasks that appear in initial mandates but also whether and how they change 
over the mission’s lifespan. Most missions go through several stages, often starting with an 
initial monitoring role, expanding into an ambitious programme of support to the political 
transition, and switching to a capacity-building and advisory mode closer to drawdown. 
Understanding these changes is essential, as we demonstrate using the example of the mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) below. 
 
In short, existing data sources are, to different extents, incomplete in terms of mandated tasks, 
do not differentiate between modalities of engagement, and cover only initial mandates. They 
do not provide a solid basis for answering questions about the effects of mandates on 
peacekeeping outcomes or the politics of mandate negotiations.  
 
The PEMA Dataset: Selection, Variables, and Coding 
The PEMA dataset codes UN Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping operations in 
Africa authorized from 1991 to 2017. This temporal and geographical scope covers all recent 
multidimensional peacekeeping missions and makes the PEMA dataset compatible with other 
existing data collection efforts, which often focus on peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bromley 2018; Cil et al. 2020, Hunnicutt and Nomikos 2020). To create the data, we 
downloaded UNSC resolutions on peacekeeping missions from the Council’s website9 and 
coded 386 resolutions in total, covering 27 peacekeeping missions over time.10 Each document 
has been coded twice independently by two authors and then each discrepancy has been 
discussed to agree on the final coding. The Codebook in the Appendix discusses the coding 
rules and the coding decisions in detail and with examples. The dataset includes the resolution 
and exact paragraph number on which each coding decision is based, which allows users to 
check and replicate the data collection. 
 
9 https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0. Accessed March 2020. 
10 List of coded missions in alphabetical order: MINUCI, MINURCA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MINUSCA, 
MINUSMA, MONUA, MONUC, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNAMID, UNAMIR, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM II, 
UNAVEM III, UNISFA, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOMIL, UNOMOZ, UNOMSIL, 
UNOMUR, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. 




The PEMA dataset records information on mandated tasks at the mission-resolution level. This 
means that PEMA is the first panel dataset on UN missions’ mandates, with each row of data 
corresponding to a new Security Council resolution. Beyond a set of identification variables, 
including the acronym of the mission, the host country, the number of the resolution, and its 
publication date, the PEMA dataset includes two main sets of substantive variables. 
 
The first set of variables relates to the content of the mandate. We code 39 different types of 
tasks. A mission can potentially have all tasks assigned. The tasks include stability-related tasks 
such as disarmament and demobilization or the use of force, peacebuilding-related tasks such 
as electoral assistance or legal reform, and rights-based tasks such as human rights and 
children’s rights. The Codebook in the Appendix provides the full list of tasks (also in Table 
1) and examples from UNSC resolutions that illustrate the substantive differences between 
them.   
 
We can demonstrate the need for this fine-grained disaggregation of peacekeeping tasks using 
two examples. The first example is disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, often 
analyzed as one category, DDR. In the PEMA dataset, disarmament and demobilization are 
coded separately from reintegration. Disarmament and demobilization have been established 
features of peacekeeping mandates since the early 1990s. Reintegration was much more 
contested: it required additional funding in peacekeeping budgets, and member states were 
reluctant to spend money on ex-combatants who might have committed war crimes. UN 
officials managed to secure the addition of this task to some peacekeeping mandates by 
reframing it as “reinsertion” and promising to request funds only in the mission’s first year 
(Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann 2011). Disaggregating DDR into two categories allows 
us to reflect such nuanced differences.  
 
The second example is reconciliation. The few studies that list it as a separate category do not 
differentiate between national, local, and regional reconciliation. However, Autesserre (2010) 
argues that the peacekeeping mission in the DRC has been ineffective because it focused on 
national-level reconciliation and ignored local conflicts. While the mission eventually started 
paying some attention to local reconciliation, it was further called upon to offer greater support 
to the government in mending relations with its neighbors (International Crisis Group 2019). 
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By including categories for different types of reconciliation, the PEMA dataset enables 
research into varying and level-dependent effects.  
 
For each of the 39 tasks, the PEMA dataset also records the modality of engagement expected 
from the mission. Modality refers to the form of peacekeepers’ involvement in a policy field. 
We code three different modalities: monitoring, assisting, and securing. We code a task as 
monitoring if it engages mission personnel as observers and there is no direct involvement in 
implementation. We code a task as assisting if mission personnel are requested to help 
implement a task, for example, by providing support to electoral management bodies. 
Assistance includes coordinating activities and supporting their implementation, including by 
offering good offices, technical assistance, or logistical support. Finally, we code a task as 
securing if it involves peacekeepers providing security (relying on the direct or indirect use of 
military means), such as establishing humanitarian corridors or guarding polling stations 
against violent interference. 
 
Moreover, we record the strength of the mandate provisions by specifying whether the UNSC 
requests a task or merely encourages it. For example, the Council can request the mission to 
use public information campaigns to increase awareness of the mission’s activities, but 
oftentimes this task is only encouraged. For requested tasks, we code whether the Council asks 
peacekeepers to monitor, assist, or secure the activities. By contrast, for encouraged tasks, 
resolutions normally do not explicitly refer to the modality of engagement, and we thus do not 
record it in the PEMA dataset. To further illustrate this, Table 2 reports the exact wording of 
UNSC resolution paragraphs that either request peacekeepers to monitor, assist or secure 
disarmament and demobilization or encourage engagement with this task. 
 
The second set of variables indicates whether the resolution stipulates a complete adjustment 
of the mandate, a minor adjustment, or a simple extension of the mission. We code a complete 
adjustment when a new peacekeeping operation is first authorized or when at least one new 
task is added or dropped. Often, the resolution makes this change explicit by stating that “from 
the resolution onwards, [the peacekeeping operation] shall have the following mandate.” We 
code a minor adjustment when there is a change in the requested modality of engagement or 
the strength of the mandate provision, but no new tasks are added. 
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Table 2. Coding examples. 
  







Contribute to the implementation of the 
national programme of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) […]  by monitoring the 
disarmament process11 
Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate 
with the Government of the Republic 
of South Sudan […] [to] support 
disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration efforts12  
Assisting 
Requests the Secretary-General to 
appoint expeditiously a Special 
Representative […] who shall […] 
coordinate the overall support of the 
international community in Mali, 
including in the field of Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration13 
Securing 
To provide security in and at all sites of 




Security Council resolutions commonly include provisions that are not directly related to 
peacekeepers’ tasks. Three types of such provisions are excluded from our data. First, we do 
not code tasks that the Council requests from entities other than the mission. For example, in 
Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994, the Council requested the UN Secretary-General rather than 
the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda to undertake efforts to support an arms embargo 
committee. Second, we do not code tasks based on the expected outcome. For example, if a 
resolution requests a mission to assist with the re-establishment of state authority in order to 
enable economic recovery, we code only assistance to state authority and not economic 
recovery, unless the resolution requests peacekeepers to assist with economic recovery 
elsewhere in the same resolution. Third, we exclude vague references that lack clearly 
identifiable tasks, the “welcoming” of progress and ongoing tasks, and references to the 
 
11 MONUC, S/RES/1756, §2n. 
12 MINUSMA, S/RES/2100, §11. 
13 UNMISS, S/RES/2057, §19. 
14 UNAMSIL, S/RES/1289, §10c. 
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capacities needed to carry out certain tasks.  More details on the coding procedure are available 
in the Codebook. 
 
Patterns in the Data: Variation in Mandates Across and Within Missions   
This section provides a descriptive overview of peacekeeping mandates using the PEMA data. 
It introduces some key patterns of variation and illustrates the heterogeneity that exists in UN 
peacekeeping mandates, both across and within missions. Despite the frequent criticism that 
peacekeeping mandates are very similar and follow a template approach (UN 2015; Ruggeri et 
al. 2013; Howard and Dayal 2018), a closer inspection reveals considerable variation.  
 
Figure 1 exhibits the mandated tasks of the missions in the sample, as coded at the outset of 
each mission. Mandated tasks are marked as present (dark grey) if the relevant resolution 
included any modality of engagement in these tasks. Even this fairly simple overview allows 
us to corroborate three key patterns discussed in the literature on peacekeeping. First, there has 
been considerable growth in the scope of UN mandates. The five oldest missions in the sample, 
established in the early 1990s, included an average of 5.8 tasks per mandate, considerably 
fewer than the average of 20.8 tasks for five missions established in the 2010s. This trend 
reflects the widening expectations placed on UN missions by the Security Council.  
 
Second, we observe an expansion of mandates into new areas. Most clearly, this is reflected in 
the growth of tasks relating to enhancing state capacity, reconciliation, and economic 
development. None of the earlier missions in the sample were requested to carry out these 
tasks, but in the 2000s and the 2010s, such tasks were present in the majority of newly launched 
missions. While researchers have already noted the expansion of mandates into new areas 
(Gizelis et al. 2016), our data present a systematic picture of how it has evolved, across specific 
missions and tasks, resolution by resolution.  
 
Third, we observe a trend towards the disaggregation of tasks within broader policy areas. For 
example, what was previously described as “security sector reform”15 has become divided into 
a series of more specified tasks, such as “military reform” and “police reform,” which are not 
 
15 For example, the 2003 resolution adjusting the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (MONUC) encouraged the mission to provide assistance “for the reform of the security forces” 
(MONUC, S/RES/1493, §5). 
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always mandated simultaneously.16 Furthermore, security sector reform can also be coupled 
with related tasks like “justice reform” and “prison reform” in some recent resolutions. 
Importantly, our data allow us to identify whether the much-discussed expansion of 
peacekeeping mandates is mostly attributable to the disaggregation of older tasks or the 
addition of completely new tasks.    
 
Since the PEMA dataset is structured as panel data, with multiple observations on each mission 
over time, it allows us to track the evolution of specific mandates. This may be particularly 
relevant for researchers carrying out single-mission case studies or investigating mission-
specific patterns, but it may also be useful for researchers considering variation in the 
longitudinal impact of missions.  
 
As an illustration of how the PEMA dataset incorporates mission-specific data, Figure 2 shows 
the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
established in 1999 as the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC) and since 2010 known as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUSCO). Resolution S/RES/1925 marks the beginning of MONUSCO. 
 
We observe the nuanced picture of peacekeeping mandate evolution that the PEMA data make 
possible. In the case of MONUC/MONUSCO, the mandate has evolved over six phases. In the 
first short phase, it was a small liaison mission with a few core tasks, most centrally assistance 
with ceasefire observation. The second phase, starting in early 2000, saw the establishment of 
a larger mission with a wider mandate, including reconciliation and DDR. With some smaller 
modifications, this mandate remained the same in 2003, which ushered in the third phase. 
Following the signing of the Sun City Agreement and the beginning of the political transition 
period, MONUC saw its force increased and its mandate expanded to include yet more tasks, 
including support to the electoral process, state capacity, and arms embargo monitoring. 
   
 
16 To accurately reflect this disaggregation in our dataset, when a resolution mentions “security sector reform,” 
we code for both military and police reform. 














Figure 2.  Mandate of MONUC & MONUSCO (1999-2017).  
 
In 2004, the fourth phase saw an increase in troops and another widening of the mandate, now 
crucially also including offensive operations. After the 2006 elections, the fifth phase that 
began in 2007 implied that some previous tasks, such as assistance for legal reform, were 
discontinued, whereas tasks relating to reconciliation, public information, and civil society 
were added, reflecting the mission’s increasingly multidimensional profile.17 The sixth and 
final phase saw the initiation of a reduction of the mission’s mandate and strength, starting in 
2016. 
 
This brief description underlines the importance of having mandate data that can be temporally 
disaggregated. It is clear that MONUC, as established in 1999, was a very different operation 
 
17 The change from MONUC to MONUSCO was not associated with significant changes to the mandate. 
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from MONUC of 2004 or MONUSCO of 2017. These changes reflect the Security Council’s 
evaluation of the mission’s changing political and military environment, as well as the general 
evolution of UN peacekeeping doctrine and practice. Thus, the MONUC/MONUSCO example 
clearly illustrates the potential pitfalls of overlooking the dynamic nature of peacekeeping 
missions and basing research on simplified measures of mandates or, even more 
problematically, overlooking them entirely.  
 
Research Avenues Opened by the PEMA Dataset 
The PEMA dataset opens two principal avenues for research. The first avenue looks at 
peacekeeping as an instrument of conflict resolution. Studies have started evaluating whether 
specific mandated tasks affect missions’ performance. Murdie (2017) argues that mandates that 
focus on humanitarian assistance or protection of civilians improve the human rights situation 
in the host country. Heldt (2011) contends that mandates with democracy-related provisions 
enable peacekeepers to contribute to democratization. We recognize that peacekeepers do not 
always fulfill all the tasks assigned to them. It is an important question in itself whether and 
when peacekeeping missions actually implement their mandates (Blair et al. 2020). We also 
recognize that peacekeepers can engage in activities not mentioned in the mandate on their own 
initiative. However, mandates serve as an important source of legitimation for peacekeepers’ 
activities within the mission, in the eyes of host state counterparts, and among member states 
who support peacekeeping politically or materially. The data on mandates could therefore be 
used in conjunction with data on actual activities of peacekeeping missions. Studies already 
exist that use data on peacekeeping activities, as reported by the UN (Dorussen and Gizelis 
2013; Smidt 2020). Looking at how peacekeeping tasks, both mandated and implemented, 
influence peacekeeping outcomes is a fruitful avenue for research within the growing literature 
on the effects and legacies of peacekeeping operations (e.g., Gledhill 2020).  
 
The second avenue looks at peacekeeping as an international institution. Peacekeeping 
mandate negotiations are a site of global power struggles, with the five permanent members of 
the Security Council, the elected members, and non-state actors vying for influence. Since the 
UNSC is the embodiment of a great power concert, studying its approach to mandates can 
reveal international society’s normative priorities, which could signal, for example, decreasing 
emphasis on democratization but a greater concern with environmental protection. Scholars 
who study the evolution of specific mandate provisions over time, such as human rights 
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(Katayanagi 2002; Månsson 2006), security sector reform (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008), 
protection of civilians (Mamiya 2016), protection of children (Bode 2018), gender 
mainstreaming (Karim and Beardsley 2017), public information and strategic communications 
(Oksamytna 2018), or environmental protection (Maertens 2019), could benefit from a 
comprehensive overview of this evolution across and within peacekeeping missions. Studies 
could also investigate internal factors (UNSC composition and power differentials or members’ 
foreign policies and relations with the host government) and external pressures (civil society 
activism or media attention) shaping the Council’s approach to mandated tasks. Studies could 
investigate the UN Secretariat’s reactions to the expansion and disaggregation of mandates to 
complement recent research on UN officials’ role at the mandate formulation stage (Oksamytna 
and Lundgren 2020). Furthermore, investigating whether peacekeeping budgets have kept pace 
with mandate expansion could add to the growing body of research on the politics of financing 
international organization (e.g., Patz and Goetz 2019).  
 
While these two avenues for further research are our suggestions on how the PEMA data can 
be used, they are not exhaustive. We can also imagine that the data can be useful for 
comparative research on international organizations. Many international organizations have 
also experienced an expansion of their tasks and the approach taken here should be replicable 
in research on other institutions and other issue areas. For example, the International Monetary 
Fund has been tasked with monitoring a growing list of conditions in its agreements with 
borrowers, which currently include twenty policy areas, such as central bank reform or 
privatization (e.g., Dreher et al. 2015). The PEMA dataset will therefore be useful for a diverse 
category of International Relations scholars.  
 
Re-examination of Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) 
To further illustrate the value of the PEMA data, we replicate the study by Hultman, Kathman, 
and Shannon (2013; henceforth HKS) on the effects of peacekeeping deployments on civilian 
victimization, using the exact same model specifications, data sources and sample as HKS and 
then adding measures of civilian protection mandates from our PEMA dataset. As one of the 
first studies to systematically assess the UN’s ability to deliver on a headline ambition, the 
HKS article has been influential in the peacekeeping literature. HKS argue that peacekeepers 
can mitigate violence against civilians by altering belligerents’ incentives and by physically 
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shielding civilians from attack. Peacekeepers’ ability to do so, HKS argue, depends on the size 
and composition of the force across the categories of troops, police, and military observers.  
 
The key contribution of HKS concerns the importance of missions’ size and composition. 
While HKS mention the potential relevance of mandates, the lack of available data limited their 
ability to provide a detailed test of how mandates can support protection of civilians. They use 
two dummy variables coding robust mandates or Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates. The 
latter is coded as 1 if the mandate refers to POC. HKS are not explicit about which resolutions 
they code, but comparing their coding of POC to PEMA’s coding, it seems that only the initial 
resolutions authorizing a mission were coded to identify POC mandates. This means that, for 
example, missions such as the UN operations in Burundi or Rwanda are not coded as POC 
missions, even though they had such mandates during considerable portions of their lifetimes 
but not at the point of authorization. Also, a request to actively protect civilians or an instruction 
to merely monitor their situation would likely affect peacekeepers’ resolve in stopping civilian 
victimization differently. Whether a UN force has the ability to reduce civilian victimization, 
after all, depends on its size and composition, but also very likely on whether and how the 
mission is specifically mandated to pursue this objective. 
 
To evaluate the impact of mandates and demonstrate the utility of our data, we re-evaluate and 
extend HKS. We use an identical, multivariate research design to examine variation in the 
count of civilians killed in a conflict month as a function of a set of independent variables. Like 
HKS, we use a negative binomial estimator on their sample of all intrastate armed conflicts in 
sub-Saharan Africa from 1991 to 2008 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2009; 
Melander and Sundberg 2013). We replicate the main specification without fixed-effects, as in 
the original HKS article, but as the authors, we also provide robustness models including 
conflict fixed-effects in the Appendix (Tables A.4-A.6). The HKS data covers 20 peacekeeping 
missions, 18 of which are included in our dataset.18 
 
Beyond the HKS variables, which are exactly as in the original study, we enter three types of 
mandate variables. The first, POC mandate, has the same logic as the POC measure in HKS – 
it is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a mandate includes POC tasks where peacekeepers 
either help the government in protecting civilians or are requested to carry out POC without 
 
18 BINUB in Burundi and UNOA in Angola are not coded in PEMA because these are Special Political Missions. 
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any reference to the government’s support. Second, we disaggregate the POC dummy into POC 
active and POC passive types. The former is identical to the first POC mandate dummy (i.e., 
the mission protects civilians alone or in coordination with the government), while the latter 
means that POC is only encouraged or requested as a monitoring task by the UNSC.  
 
To facilitate comparison, we report coefficient plots with estimates across different models; 
full tables are available in the Appendix. We begin with negative binomial models of the sum 
of civilian killings in a given conflict-month. Coefficients in Figure 3 largely confirm the HKS 
finding that the size of missions matters and so does a mandate to protect civilians. Indeed, the 
estimated coefficient of HKS POC dummy and ours are virtually identical and associated with 
fewer civilian deaths. Interestingly, when disaggregating passive and active POC mandates, 
the violence-reduction effect is largely due to active POC provisions.  
 
 
Figure 3. Coefficient Plot from Table A.1 (Appendix). 
 
In Figure 4, we follow HKS in disaggregating violence against civilians as perpetrated by either 
rebels or the government. When focusing on rebels (top panel, Figure 4), we see that mandates 
are largely irrelevant in explaining missions’ capacity to protect civilians. Except for active 
POC that is weakly associated with less OSV (p-value < 0.1), peacekeeping missions seem to 
effectively deter rebel violence only via large military deployments. The literature on 
peacekeeping effectiveness has proposed deterrence and signaling as key mechanisms of 
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missions’ success (e.g., Ruggeri et al. 2017; Fjelde et al. 2019). It is possible that rebels are 
more likely to be deterred and refrain from using violence when they are confronted with a 
large military deployment, regardless of the specificities of its mandate. Indeed, rebels may be 
undeterred even by strong POC mandates if they do not understand the subtleties of the legal 
formulas in UNSC resolutions or are unaware of the mandate altogether, especially at lower 
levels of the chain of command. Conversely, a visible presence of a sizeable military contingent 
sends a clear and unambiguous message. Governments, on the other hand, may behave 
differently, not the least because they, as mission hosts, are likely to be more aware of mandate 
specificities. 
 
The centrality of mandates in the mission-host state relation is mirrored in the findings in the 
bottom panel in Figure 4, where we focus on government-sponsored violence against civilians. 
First, we find that the size of the deployment is irrelevant to missions’ ability to protect civilians 
against violence perpetrated by the government. Second, POC provisions in mandates now 
largely explain the violence-curbing effect of peacekeeping. In particular, POC mandates 
decrease violence against civilians perpetrated by the government, but only if mandated with 
active POC. This means there are two scenarios under which a peacekeeping mission is 
effective at preventing civilian victimization by government forces: when it has the 
authorization to act alone to stop it or when it is instructed to assist the host government in 
protecting civilians, which implies a cooperative relationship with local army and police. This 
relationship can both increase the capacity of national security actors and allow peacekeepers 
to advocate against abusive behavior by local partners. By contrast, passive POC mandates that 
involve monitoring others’ protection activities or simply encourage the mission to engage in 
POC are likely to exacerbate violence against civilians by the government. It is plausible that 
the mechanism linking passive POC to increases in civilian victimization is similar to the 
HKS’s finding showing that UN observers, who lack military capacity, are associated with 
more civilian deaths. This is because the deployment of observers, probably like passive POC 
provisions, signals the possibility that more robust actions will be implemented soon, hence 
pushing parties to escalate and consolidate their advantage. 
 
In their extended tests, HKS carries out a matching study, pairing up civil wars with PKOs 
(treated) with civil wars without PKOs (untreated), finding results that align with their main 
regression results. Since it is not meaningful to match on a variable with many values – like 
our POC variables – in a limited sample, we do not replicate this extension. Furthermore, we 
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do not believe that the direction of the bias due to non-random assignment of mandates is clear-
cut.19 Notably, HKS’ matching results are not substantially different from the non-matching 
results, hence reducing concerns about covariates’ imbalance biasing the results. 
 
These results do not undermine the general validity of HKS findings but clearly illustrate how 
the nature of peacekeeping mandates shapes the UN’s ability to diminish civilian victimization, 
depending on who perpetrates the violence. Governments and rebels engage with peacekeeping 
operations in different ways, and their incentives to cooperate with the mission differ. For 
rebels, size matters more than the mandate, but this is not the case for host governments. Our 
re-evaluation and extension of HKS thus demonstrate that the ability to incorporate nuanced 
data on mandates is an important development in peacekeeping research not only for empirical 
reasons, but also for our understanding of how peacekeeping works. This is especially valuable 
in light of the recent interest in the nuanced mechanism through which peacekeeping operations 
produce effects through persuasion, inducement, or deterrence (Howard 2019; Hultman et al. 
2019; Bove et al. 2020). Absent disaggregated mandate data, scholars run the risk of 
exaggerating the effects of variables or underplay the importance of different actors with whom 
peacekeeping missions deal.  
 
19 On the one hand, POC mandates, like robust mandates, are more likely in conflicts with high levels of 
violence against civilians (Hultman 2013). On the other hand, governments that perpetrate violence against 
civilians are more likely to oppose a POC mandate, which might make the UNSC more reluctant to assign it. 
However, as we describe below, POC is often authorized by the UNSC even without the government’s support. 
Thus, while the direction of the bias is not clear, future research will be able to leverage PEMA’s level of details 
to shed light on the mission-host government dynamics, explaining how these factor into peacekeeping mandate 
negotiations. 




Figure 4. Coefficient Plot from Table A.2 (top panel) and A.3 (bottom panel). Tables in 
Appendix. 
 
Viewed independently, the finding that mandates matter underlines the importance of the 
UNSC thinking carefully about the formulation of mandates. If POC is part of the Council’s 
ambition, it must ensure that this is reflected in clearly formulated mandates, and that POC, if 
possible, is requested at the most demanding modality of engagement, i.e., assisting local 
security actors or providing security for protection of civilians. 
 




The Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset covers initial and revised mandates of 27 
peacekeeping missions in Africa in the 1991-2017 period. It codes 39 tasks at three modalities 
of engagement, specifying whether a mission is instructed to monitor, assist, or secure the task. 
The data also record whether the mandate requests or merely encourages engagement in a given 
task. It therefore goes beyond any of the existing efforts to classify or code peacekeeping tasks 
in terms of its detail and coverage. 
 
The descriptive patterns in the data clearly show the expansion, diversification, and increasing 
granularity of peacekeeping provisions in UNSC resolutions. They demonstrate heterogeneity 
in UN peacekeeping mandates across and within missions, which challenges the widely held 
assumption that mandate design follows a template approach. They also point to the importance 
of analyzing not only initial but also revised mandates, considering that some missions last for 
decades and experience significant alterations of their role and purpose. 
 
Our re-evaluation and extension of Hultman et al. (2013) illustrates the research utility that 
flows from having highly disaggregated mandate data. We show that mandate design has 
important implications for the UN’s ability to decrease violence against civilians. While the 
peacekeeping force’s size and composition do matter, as Hultman et al. argue, the addition of 
finely disaggregated mandate data reveals two new findings. First, missions’ ability to 
minimize violence against the local population is strengthened only when they are mandated 
to engage in active protection of civilians, as opposed to passive modalities of engagement. 
Second, the effect of such mandates varies across potential perpetrators. Whereas violence 
against civilians by rebel groups appears to be unaffected by stronger mandates, civilian 
victimization by the government is more sensitive to nuances in the mandate language. These 
results indicate that disaggregated mandate data can help identify the conditions under which 
peacekeepers can prevent and mitigate violence against civilians and address other problems 
they are deployed to ameliorate. 
 
We have identified two major research avenues based on the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) 
dataset. The first avenue is the analysis of peacekeeping as an instrument of conflict resolution. 
It entails focusing on how mandates strengthen peacekeepers’ resolve and translate into 
peacekeeping activities and outcomes on the ground. The second avenue is the study of UN 
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peacekeepers as an international institution. It entails analyzing how peacekeeping resolutions 
reflect the priorities of, and frictions within, the international community. The Peacekeeping 
Mandates (PEMA) dataset will be useful to scholars working in the fields of international 
security, peace studies, international organizations, and foreign policy.  
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 Tables with Full Models 
 
Table A.1. Negative Binomial Models; DV: All One-Sided Violence 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
HKS POC 0/1 -0.479**   
 (0.192)   
PEMA POC 0/1  -0.503**  
  (0.197)  
PEMA Passive POC 0/1   0.303 
   (0.225) 
PEMA Active POC 0/1   -0.602*** 
   (0.215) 
UN Troops -0.081** -0.077** -0.068** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
UN Police 0.380 0.231 -0.033 
 (0.428) (0.445) (0.497) 
UN observers 0.958* 1.139** 1.097* 
 (0.531) (0.568) (0.579) 
Battle-Deaths (all) 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OSV (all) 2.070*** 2.078*** 2.071*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
Incompatibility 0.741*** 0.726*** 0.741*** 
 (0.127) (0.126) (0.127) 
Episode Duration 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (log) 0.359*** 0.347*** 0.356*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) 
Observations 3746 3746 3746 
AIC 11392.388 11392.019 11392.216 
BIC 11467.129 11466.760 11473.186 
    
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01    
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Table A.2. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Rebels One-Sided Violence 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
    
HKS POC 0/1 -0.329   
 (0.208)   
PEMA POC 0/1  -0.350*  
  (0.210)  
PEMA Passive POC 0/1   0.290 
   (0.255) 
PEMA Active POC 0/1   -0.428* 
   (0.225) 
UN Troops -0.084** -0.083** -0.075** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
UN Police 0.350 0.294 0.046 
 (0.458) (0.466) (0.526) 
UN observers 0.939* 1.020* 0.970 
 (0.565) (0.583) (0.593) 
Battle-Deaths (all) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Battle-Deaths (side A) -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rebels OSV 2.174*** 2.173*** 2.170*** 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) 
Government OSV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incompatibility 0.619*** 0.619*** 0.628*** 
 (0.221) (0.221) (0.221) 
Episode Duration 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (log) 0.150*** 0.147** 0.153*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Observations 3746 3746 3746 
AIC 8103.900 8103.596 8104.312 
BIC 8191.098 8190.795 8197.739 
    
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01    
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Table A.3. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Government One-Sided Violence 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
    
HKS POC 0/1 -1.498***   
 (0.347)   
PEMA POC 0/1  -0.703**  
  (0.298)  
PEMA Passive POC 0/1   1.651*** 
   (0.341) 
PEMA Active POC 0/1   -1.149*** 
   (0.355) 
UN Troops -0.073 -0.072 -0.036 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.048) 
UN Police 1.332** 1.405** 0.158 
 (0.627) (0.597) (0.724) 
UN observers 2.026** 0.839 0.383 
 (0.888) (0.854) (0.943) 
Battle-Deaths (side B) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Battle-Deaths (side A) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rebels OSV 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incompatibility 1.242*** 1.168*** 1.223*** 
 (0.165) (0.164) (0.163) 
Episode Duration 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (log) 0.989*** 0.946*** 0.977*** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) 
Observations 3746 3746 3746 
AIC 6166.550 6183.216 6159.768 
BIC 6247.519 6264.186 6246.966 
    
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01    
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Tables with Fixed-Effects Models 
 
Table A.4. Negative Binomial Models; DV: All One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-Effects. 
 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
    
HKS POC 0/1 -0.432**   
 (0.189)   
PEMA POC 0/1  -0.475**  
  (0.194)  
PEMA Passive POC 0/1   0.322 
   (0.223) 
PEMA Active POC 0/1   -0.579*** 
   (0.212) 
UN Troops -0.084** -0.080** -0.072** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
UN Police 0.426 0.273 0.008 
 (0.422) (0.439) (0.487) 
UN observers 0.918* 1.127** 1.073* 
 (0.521) (0.557) (0.570) 
Battle-Deaths (all) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OSV (all) 1.990*** 1.997*** 1.989*** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Incompatibility 0.703*** 0.691*** 0.708*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
Episode Duration 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (log) 0.330*** 0.318*** 0.328*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
Observations 3264.000 3264.000 3264.000 
AIC 10881.147 10880.244 10880.170 
BIC 10942.054 10941.151 10947.168 
Conflict FE Yes Yes Yes 
Std. Err. clustered by Conflict    
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01    
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Table A.5. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Rebels One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-Effects. 
 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
    
HKS POC 0/1 -0.321   
 (0.208)   
PEMA POC 0/1  -0.344  
  (0.210)  
PEMA Passive POC 0/1   0.298 
   (0.254) 
PEMA Active POC 0/1   -0.423* 
   (0.224) 
UN Troops -0.085** -0.083** -0.075** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
UN Police 0.357 0.299 0.047 
 (0.456) (0.465) (0.524) 
UN observers 0.940* 1.023* 0.971 
 (0.563) (0.581) (0.591) 
Battle-Deaths (all) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Battle-Deaths (side A) -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rebels OSV 2.154*** 2.153*** 2.149*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Government OSV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incompatibility 0.556** 0.556** 0.566*** 
 (0.217) (0.217) (0.217) 
Episode Duration 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (log) 0.148** 0.145** 0.151*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Observations 2498 2498 2498 
AIC 7725.592 7725.256 7725.888 
BIC 7795.471 7795.135 7801.590 
Conflict FE Yes Yes Yes 
Std. Err. clustered by Conflict    
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01    
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Table A.6. Negative Binomial Models; DV: Government One-Sided Violence, with Conflict Fixed-
Effects. 
 
 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
    
HKS POC 0/1 -1.564***   
 (0.353)   
PEMA POC 0/1  -0.755**  
  (0.302)  
PEMA Passive POC 0/1   1.644*** 
   (0.345) 
PEMA Active POC 0/1   -1.194*** 
   (0.361) 
UN Troops -0.091 -0.085 -0.041 
 (0.058) (0.055) (0.050) 
UN Police 1.530** 1.539** 0.183 
 (0.680) (0.635) (0.757) 
UN observers 2.235** 1.017 0.532 
 (0.913) (0.881) (0.959) 
Battle-Deaths (side B) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Battle-Deaths (side A) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rebels OSV 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incompatibility 1.270*** 1.191*** 1.248*** 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.166) 
Episode Duration 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population (log) 0.971*** 0.922*** 0.955*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) 
Observations 3063 3063 3063. 
AIC 5719.267 5736.557 5714.043 
BIC 5785.566 5802.856 5786.368 
Conflict FE Yes Yes Yes 
Std. Err. clustered by Conflict    
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Codebook for the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset  
This document sets out the coding criteria used to collect data on the United Nations Security Council’s 
(UNSC) resolutions that authorize, extend or modify the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations (PKO) from 1991-2017. The 27 missions currently included are (in alphabetic order) 
MINUCI, MINURCA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUA, MONUC, 
MONUSCO, ONUB, UNAMID, UNAMIR, UNAMIS, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, 
UNISFA, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOMIL, UNOMOZ, UNOMSIL, 
UNOMUR, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. 
 
We code a comprehensive list of tasks or policy areas that the PKO is mandated to do.  
 
We code the following tasks: 
1. Disarmament & Demobilization 
2. Reintegration 
3. Control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
4. Demilitarization 
5. Arms Embargo 
6. Civilian Protection 
7. Human Rights 
8. Child Rights 
9. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
10. Police Reform 
11. Military Reform 
12. Offensive Operations 
13. Justice Sector Reform 
14. Transitional Justice 
15. Prison Reform 
16. Border Control 
17. Demining 
18. Resources 
19. State Authority Extension 
20. Democratization 
21. Electoral Security 
22. Electoral Assistance 
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23. Voter Education 
24. Political Party Assistance 
25. Civil Society Assistance 
26. Media 
27. Power Sharing 
28. Reconciliation 
29. Local Reconciliation 
30. Regional Reconciliation 
31. Economic Development 
32. Humanitarian Relief 
33. Public Health 
34. Refugee Assistance 
35. Gender 
36. Legal Reform 
37. Ceasefire 
38. Peace Agreement 
39. Use of Force 
 
Conceptually, we code both a) the modality of PKO engagement (monitoring, assisting and 
securing) and b) the strength of the UNSC request (requesting and encouraging). The table 
below clarifies this conceptualization:  
  Strength of mandate provision 





Contribute to the implementation of 
the national programme of 
disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) […]  by 
monitoring the disarmament 
process20 
Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate 
with the Government of the 
Republic of South Sudan […] [to] 
support disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration 
efforts21  
Assisting 
Requests the Secretary-General to 
appoint expeditiously a Special 
Representative […] who shall […] 
coordinate the overall support of 
the international community in 
Mali, including in the field of 
 
20 MONUC, S/RES/1756, §2n. 
21 MINUSMA, S/RES/2100, §11. 
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Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration22 
Securing 
To provide security in and at all 
sites of the disarmament, 




There are three modalities of engagement that can be mandated by the Security Council to the mission. 
We call those engagement categories. All three modalities of PKO engagement can occur if the strength 
of UNSC request is “requesting” rather than “encouraging” the PKO to do something. 
• Monitoring: It includes tasks related to engagement of peacekeepers as observers of 
compliance and/or implementation. Good indicators for mandated monitoring tasks 
are sentences that start with request the PKO to / decides that the PKO should / 
approves the PKO will / monitor / report / observe / verify / establish an early warning 
system / follow-up etc. 
• Assisting: It includes active involvement of the mission personnel, including 
coordination of activities and support for implementation of policies. In this 
category, peacekeepers can both implement and carry out the tasks autonomously or 
help the government to engage in a task (including by providing good offices). Thus, 
we also code PKO activities if the mandate states that the government shall do an 
activity (e.g. small arms control), with the support of the PKO (see example under 
Control Small Arms and Light Weapons, i.e. ControlSALW). The level of engagement 
is thus higher than Monitoring. A good indicator for mandated assistance activities are 
sentences that starts with requests the PKO to / decides that the PKO should / approves 
the PKO will assist in the task X or support the government in carrying out the task 
X. We also code assistance activities if the resolution says that “the mandate of PKO 
states that PKO will assist [the task X]” or that it “encourages the government to work 
with the PKO”. We do not take the phrase “liaise with the government” as indicator of 
assistance. 
• Security provision: It includes tasks in which peacekeepers provide security in the 
context of one of the mandated activities. A good indicator for mandated security 
activities are sentences that start with request the PKO to / decides that the PKO should 
 
22 UNMISS, S/RES/2057, §19. 
23 UNAMSIL, S/RES/1289, §10c. 
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/ approves the PKO will help establish a secure humanitarian corridor/environment, 
provide security for X, secure and similar phrases. 
 
In some case, the mandate does not request to carry out a specific task, but it encourages the engagement 
in the activity. We capture these instances with the encouragement modality. If the UNSC encourages 
the PKO to do something, then we do not distinguish between the different modalities of engagement 
but only code the type of task that is encouraged by the UNSC: 
 
• Encourage: A good indicator for encouraged activities are sentences that start with 
encourages / urges / calls upon / emphasize need to consider etc. We do not code praise 
for past activities of the mission, e.g. if the Secretary General expresses its appreciation 
/ commends / welcomes / expresses its support / endorses etc. an activity. While monitor 
and assist relate to the missions’ degree of engagement in the activities, encourage 
relates to the degree of obligation to fulfil the mandated activities (independent of 




We also code tasks that are mandated conditionally because they indicate that the UNSC is 
authorizing the mission to perform them to some extent. For example, we code Arms Embarg_: Monitor 
here: 
 
“Requests the Government of Sudan and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to 
propose by 20 July modalities for implementation of the 29 June agreement on border 
monitoring, and in case the parties fail to do so, requests UNMISS to observe and report on 
any flow of personnel, arms, and related materiel across the border with Sudan” (S/RES/1996, 
2011). 
 
We only code tasks that the UNSC mandates for the PKO or the UN Special Representative of 
the Secretary General because the latter is the mission’s head. We do not code task mandated to 
any other entity, neither the Secretary General nor other UN agencies (e.g. UNDP).  
 
“Requests the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation 
of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the 
conflict” (S/RES/918, 1994). Here we do not code ‘Transitional Justice: Monitor’ because 
the UNSC resolution mandates the Secretary General rather than the PKO 




We do not code monitoring activities that are directed at international rather than domestic actors and 
when it is not clear from the text that the UN PKO must actively do something to monitor / gather 
information on the peacebuilding policy. For example, we do not code any monitoring activity for the 
paragraph below because the monitoring is directed at the “United Nations system support” rather than 
domestic actors or efforts. 
 
“We reiterates its request that UNMISS report back to the Council on a plan for United Nations 
system support in this regard and update the Council through the Secretary-General’s regular 
reports on progress of United Nations system support to specific peacebuilding tasks, especially 
security sector reform, police institutional development, rule of law and justice sector support, 
human rights capacity-building, early recovery, formulation of national policies related to key 
issues of state building and development, and establishing the conditions for development, 
consistent with national priorities and with a view to contributing to the development of a 
common framework for monitoring progress in these areas” (S/RES/2109, 2013). 
 
We do not code requests to the UNSG to report on progresses made toward the implementation of the 
mandate (usually found at the end of the resolution). For example, it is common to have paragraphs 
starting “Requests the Secretary-General to continue reporting to the Council every 90 days on progress 
made towards implementing UNAMID’s mandate” followed by a long list of policy areas. None is 
coded since this reporting has the mission itself as target. 
 
We do not code phrases that merely states the importance or priorities of the mission, such as “reiterates 
that the PKO should” or if the resolution “stresses the importance of” or “reaffirms [task] should be a 
priority”. 
 
We do not code expected outcomes of a task. An example from a MONUSCO resolution is the 
following: 
 
“Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in close cooperation 
with other international partners, to build on the Government’s STAREC and revised ISSSS to 
support the establishment of a minimum level of sustainable state authority and control in 
conflict-affected areas in eastern DRC, including through area-based efforts to improve 
security, state authority and enable the commencement of sustainable socio-economic 
recovery” (S/RES/2098, 2013). The only task coded from this paragraph from the 
MONUSCO resolution is assistance to state authority (State Authority: Assist); but there is 
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no evidence of assistance to economic development (Economic Development: Assist) as an 
explicit task for the mission. Economic development is just the expected outcome. 
 
“Assisting also in the ongoing political process in Somalia, which should culminate in 
the installation of a democratically elected government” (S/RES/897, 1994). 
The paragraph from an UNOSOM II resolution should not be coded as election 
assistance task (ElectionAssistance_Assist) as it indicates the expected outcome of a 
task generally related to support for the political process. 
 
We do not code activities related to the content of the peace agreement.  
 
“To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-
compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of 
the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report 
thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General” (S/RES/872, 1993). This is not coded. 
 
 
We do not code ‘Welcoming’ of progress or activities. 
 
“Welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the Action Plan to prevent and end the 
recruitment and use of children by the FARDC” (S/RES/2277, 2016). 
 
We do not code vague references to state-building, early recovery, widening popular participation, and 
effective governance.  
 
“[S]trengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern 
effectively and democratically” (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is not coded. 
 
We do not code references to the capacity to perform tasks or requests concerning the composition and 
planning of the mission, as well as coordination with other external actors (states, IOs, NGOs or UN 
agencies). For example, we do not code requests to contribute to the mission (financially and with 
personnel) or the following request for UNMISS to deploy: 
 
 “[A]ppropriate civilian component, including technical human rights investigation expertise” 
(S/RES/1996, 2011). 
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“Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the 
possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter 
of priority, the Government of Zaire on the deployment of observers including in the airfields 
located in Eastern Zaire, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel referred 
to above; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter 
within one month of the adoption of this resolution” (S/RES/997, 1995). This is not coded. 
 
We do not code requests to fill vacancies such as the following: 
 
“Requests the Secretary-General to ensure all human rights monitoring positions within 
UNAMSIL are filled in order to address the concerns raised in paragraphs 44 to 51 of the 
report of the Secretary-General” (S/RES/1346, 2001). 
 
The description of each field below further specifies other less general instances that we do not code. 
 
Coding system 
We record the exact paragraph number as evidence. For example, if paragraph 4 and paragraph 4a(i) 
contain evidence for ‘Civilian Protection: Assist’, then we record “4, 4a(ii)” in the variable field in the 
excel spreadsheet. If the paragraph is not numbered, we use page number (e.g. p5). 
We code the following variables. 
 
 Signature 
The resolution code as usually indicated in the left corner of each document. For example: S/RES/1000. 
 
 Year 
The year the resolution was passed, usually indicated in the left corner of each document or the title. 
For example: 2000. 
 
 Date 
The full date the resolution was passed, usually indicated in the left corner of each document. For 
example: 1/1/2000. The format is dd/mm/yyyy. 
 
 PKO_Name 
The acronym of the mission the resolution refers to. For example: UNMIL. The acronym is missing if 
the resolution is not specifically on a mission’s mandate but includes some potential tasks for the 
mission. Resolutions on arms embargoes, for example, may include tasks for a mission if deployed. 
When these resolutions are coded, the PKO_Name field is empty. 





This variable takes the value 1 if the resolution extends the duration of the mission, that is, if it is not 
establishing a new mission. It takes value 0 otherwise, including when the resolution authorizes a 
mission for the first time. Note that first resolution of all missions records 0 on all the three Mandate 
variables. If there is no evidence on whether this mandate is a renewal or not, then we do not code 
anything. Note that when a mission is renewed, we only code renewal instead of copy-pasting all the 
tasks originally mandated. 
 
 Mandate_MinorAdjustment 
This variable takes value 1 if the resolution modifies the mandate, usually adding new tasks. It takes 
value 0 otherwise. In most cases, resolutions list tasks that are probably new so oftentimes both 
MinorAdjustment and Renewal take value 1. For missions authorized for the first time, both variables 
are 0. This also holds for new missions that directly proceed already established UN missions, e.g. 
UNAMIR after UNOMUR is a new mission (Mandate_Renewal = 0; Mandate_MinorAdjustment = 0, 
Mandate_CompleteAdjustment = 0). Changes in deployment levels (e.g. size of the mission) are not 
coded as Adjustments. Note that when coding a MinorAdjustment, only new tasks are added; tasks that 
are still mandated but already coded in the previous resolution are not added. 
 
Mandate_CompleteAdjustment 
This variable takes the value 1 if the resolution gives a completely new mandate to the mission. Often, 
the resolution also explicitly states this, for example, by stating that “from the resolution onwards [the 
PKO] shall have the following mandate to prioritize the following tasks …”. A completely new mandate 
requires new activities to be added or new activities to be dropped in addition to a comprehensive set 
of activities to be mandated. If not explicitly mentioned, we infer complete adjustments when a 
substantial number of new fields are added or dropped from previous resolutions. Note that when a 
coding a CompleteAdjustment, we code all tasks included in the adjusted mandate (differently from 
MinorAdjustment where only new tasks are coded). 
 
“Decides to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA), requests the Secretary-General to subsume the United Nations Office in 
Mali (UNOM) into MINUSMA, with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the discharge of 
UNOM’s mandated tasks, as of the date of adoption of this resolution, further decides that the 
authority be transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013 at which point MINUSMA 
shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, 
for an initial period of 12 months…” (S/RES/2100, 2013). We code Mandate_Renewal = 0 and 
Mandate_MinorAdjustment = 0 and Mandate_CompleteAdjustment = 0. 





The list of variables below refers to distinct policy fields peacekeepers can be mandated with. As 
mentioned, peacekeepers activity in each policy field can involve three levels of engagement namely 
Monitoring, Assistance, and/or Providing Security. Notice that these levels of engagement are not 
exclusive. When the UNSC is not requesting any of these levels of engagement but only encouraging 
mission’s involvement, the policy is coded as Encouraged. 
 
Below is an example of the how Monitoring, Assistance, Security Provision or Encouragement are 
mandated in the context of “Disarmament & Demobilization”. 
• UNOMIL, S/RES/866 1993: “To monitor compliance with other elements of the Peace 
Agreement […] in particular to assist in the monitoring of the compliance with the […] 
disarmament and demobilization of combatants” → Monitoring 
• UNOMIL, S/RES/866 1993: “To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for 
the demobilization of combatants” → Assistance 
Or, MINUSMA, S/RES/2100 2013: “Requests the Secretary-General to appoint 
expeditiously a Special Representative for Mali and Head of Mission of MINUSMA 
who shall […] coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali, 
including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)” → 
Assistance 
• UNAMSIL, S/RES/1289 2000: “To provide security in and at all sites of the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme” → Provision of Security 
• UNMISS, S/RES/2057 2012: “…requests the Secretary-General to establish 
monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence, 
including rape in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict and other situations 
relevant to the implementation of resolution 1888 (2009), as appropriate, and 
encourages UNMISS as well as the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to 
actively address these issues.” → Encouragement 
 
DisarmamentDemobilization 
Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, 
explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants. Demobilization is the formal and controlled 
discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups. If DDR is mentioned, then we code both 
DisarmamentDemobilization and Reintegration. 
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 “Calls upon the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to fully implement the national 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) strategy, to expedite the ongoing DDR 
program in a coherent manner, and requests UNMISS to work closely with the Government of 
South Sudan and in coordination with all relevant United Nations actors and other 
international partners in support of the DDR process”. (S/RES/2057, 2012). We code this as 
DisarmamentDemobilization_Assist (and also for Reintegration_Assist). 
 
 “Calls upon UNMISS to coordinate with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and 
participate in regional coordination and information mechanisms to improve protection of 
civilians and support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts in light of the 
attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the Republic of South Sudan” (S/RES/2057, 




This is not an example for DisarmamentDemobilization because the UN PKO activity shall 
be aimed at its own personnel: “to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its 
personnel, including in particular those engaged in missions of observation, verification or 
DDRRR”. (S/RES/1493, 2003). 
 
When the Disarmament and Demobilization activities only refer to child soldier, we code this as 
ChildRights only. When DDR refers not only to but also to children/child soldiers, we code 
DisarmamentDemobilization, Reintegration and ChildRights.  
 
“Welcomes the progress made on the demobilization of child soldiers, and the signing of an 
action plan to end child recruitment by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan on 12 
March 2012 reaffirming the commitment to release all children from the SPLA, acknowledges 
the measures taken by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to implement the action 
plan, calls for the further implementation of this action plan, requests UNMISS to advise and 
assist the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in this regard”. (S/RES/2109, 2013). We 
code DisarmamentDemobilization _Assist, Reintegration_Assist and ChildRights_Assist. 
 
Reintegration 
Reintegration is the process in which ex-combatants turn into civilians; attempt to find employment; 
integrate into the national police/military. Reintegration can also include a phase of “reinsertion” which 
provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants. Reintegration is often part of disarmament and 
demobilization programs. But PKOs may be involved in disarmament and demobilization without 
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engaging in the reintegration process. If DDR is mentioned, then we code both 
DisarmamentDemobilization and Reintegration. 
 
“[U]rges the Government of the Central African Republic to fulfil these commitments, in 
particular: […] To continue to implement with the support of MINURCA the demobilization 





Control of small arms and light weapons (ControlSALW) refers to arms and weapons collection and 
storage programs that are sometimes conducted parallel to or after the conclusion of the disarmament 
and demobilisation process. Efforts to control SALW may also target specific groups in society, such 
as youth gangs, village elders, neighbourhood associations, defence councils, etc. They can also be 
mentioned together with the monitoring and assistance of an Arms Embargo. In contrast to 
ArmsEmbargo and Demilitarization, ControlSALW refers to management of weapons, including seizing 
weapons outside of DDR programs, collecting, storing and destroying them. 
 
“Calls for continued national efforts to address the threat posed by the illicit transfer, 
destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia 
through ensuring the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of 
weapons and ammunition, with the continued support of MONUSCO, as appropriate and 
within existing resources” (S/RES/2277, 2016). This is evidence for ControlSALW_Assist. 
 
“Requests UNMISS to observe and report on any flow of personnel, arms, and related materiel 
across the border with Sudan” (S/RES/2057, 2012). While the PKO is requested to monitor 
cross-border flows of arms, the monitoring does not take place as a result of an arms 
embargo. Therefore, we code ControlSALW_Monitor rather than ArmsEmbargo_Monitor. 
 
“To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other support, in mine 
action and weapons and ammunition management”. (S/RES/2100, 2013). This is coded as 
ControlSALW_Assist. 
 
 “to seize or collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel whose presence in the 
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 
20 of resolution 1493, and dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate”. 
(S/RES/1533, 2004). This is coded as ArmsEmbargo_Assist and ControlSALW_Assist. 




 “To continue to assist the national authorities, including the National Commission to fight 
against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in collecting, 
registering, securing and disposing of weapons and in clearing explosive remnants of war, as 




We do not code this because it is not explicitly about SALW, such as: 
“To assist the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in monitoring the borders, with particular attention 
to any crossborder movement of combatants or transfer of arms and to the situation of Liberian 




Demilitarization refers to the withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from parts of the country. For 
example, the PKO in Angola monitored the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet troops, heavy weapons 
(grenade launchers), and tanks. In Cote d’Ivoire, the PKO maintained a buffer zone. In contrast to 
ArmsEmbargo and ControlSALW, Demilitarization indicates removal of weapons form specific areas, 
including temporary zones and strips. The following example is ControlSALW (seizing weapons within 
the area, which is not DDR site) and Demilitarization (establishing an area around Protection of 
Civilians (PoC) sites). 
 
 “to supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces; within 
its capabilities and areas of deployment, to monitor compliance with the provisions of the 
Ceasefire Agreement on the supply of ammunition, weaponry and other war-related matériel 
to the field, including to all armed groups” (S/RES/1291, 2000). This is coded as 
Demilitarization_Monitor: 
 
 “[S]tresses that such actions include, but are not limited to, within UNMISS’s capacity and 
areas of deployment, defending protection of civilians sites, establishing areas around the 
sites that are not used for hostile purposes by any forces, addressing threats to the sites, 
searching individuals attempting to enter the sites, and seizing weapons from those inside or 
attempting to enter the sites, removing from and denying entry of armed actors to the 
protection of civilians sites.” (S/RES/2406, 2018). This is coded as Demilitarization_Assist: 
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“To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area 




Arms embargo refers to international restrictions or bans on the import of weapons and technology that 
could be used to organise violence (e.g. arms embargo). In contrast to ControlSALW and 
Demilitarization, it is used if there is a reference to an arms embargo. For example, the paragraph below 
is coded as both ArmsEmbargo_Monitor and ArmsEmbargo_Assist. 
 
“Requests MINUSMA, within its capabilities, its areas of deployment and without prejudice to 
its mandate, to assist the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and 
the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), 
including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 
1 of resolution 2083 (2012) (S/RES/2100, 2013). This is coded as ArmsEmbargo_Monitor. 
 
 “Request the SG to support from within Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo 
established by resolution 733 (1992) utilizing as available and appropriate the UNSOM II 
forces authorized by this resolution and to report on this subject” (S/RES/814, 1993). This is 
coded as ArmsEmbargo_Assist. 
  
CivilianProtection 
The protection of civilians refers to strategies by UN troops, police, and civilian personnel to protect 
civilians from physical harm. CivilianProtection_Monitor refers to mandated tasks which ask the PKO 
to monitor government-sponsored or its own protection efforts. CivilianProtection_Assist refers to 
mandated task which ask the PKO to assist the government. CivilianProtection_Security refers to PKO 
providing security for civilians without the government. We do not code civil disturbances here and we 
do not code references to general stabilization (unless civilian protection is mentioned). 
 
 “[C]onduct regular reviews of its geographic deployment to ensure that its forces are best 
placed to protect civilians” (S/RES/2147, 2014). This is coded as CivilianProtection_Monitor. 
 
 “Collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population.” 
(S/RES/2112, 2013). This is coded as CivilianProtection_Monitor 
 
 “Requests MINUSMA to update its protection of civilians strategy, consistent with paragraph 
19 (c) and (d) above and, in this regard, to identify threats to civilians, implement prevention 
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plans and accelerate the coordinated implementation of relevant monitoring, analysis and 
reporting arrangements” (S/RES/2295, 2016). This is coded as CivilianProtection_Monitor 
 
 “Advising and assisting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, including military 
and police at national and local levels as appropriate, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect 
civilians, in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law” 
(S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as CivilianProtection_Assist. 
 
 “Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under threat of physical 
violence, including through active patrolling, paying particular attention to civilians gathered 
in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, in the 
context of violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict, and mitigate the 
risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation;”. (S/RES/2147, 2014). This is 
coded as CivilianProtection_Security. 
 
 “To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at 
risk in Rwanda.” (UNAMIR S/1994/918, para. 3a). (S/RES/918, 1994). This is coded as 
CivilianProtection_Security. 
 
 “Deterring violence including through proactive deployment and patrols in areas at high risk 
of conflict, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, protecting civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence, in particular when the Government of the Republic of 
South Sudan is not providing such security” (S /RES/1996, 2011) This is coded as 
CivilianProtection_Security. 
 
 “Authorizes UNMISS to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the 
areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection mandate as set out in resolution 
1996 (2011), paragraphs 3 (b) (iv), 3 (b) (v), and 3 (b) (vi)” (S/RES/2057, 2012). This is coded 
as CivilianProtection_Security. This is also coded as UseOfForce. 
 
 “[U]rges UNMISS to deploy its assets accordingly, and underscores the need for UNMISS to 
focus adequate attention on capacity-building efforts in this area, welcomes the development 
of a protection of civilians strategy and early warning and early response 
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Human rights activities should only be coded if the resolution mentions the phrase “human rights”.  
 
 “Monitor, report and follow-up on human rights violations and abuses and violations of 
international humanitarian law, including in the context of elections, and support the United 
Nations system in-country to ensure that any support provided by the United Nations shall be 
consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law and refugee law as 
applicable;” (S/RES/2211, 2015). This is coded as HumanRights_Monitor. 
 
“Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate 
the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and 
agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;” 
(S/RES/1029, 1995). This is coded as HumanRights_Encouraged because the Special 
Representative (part of the PKO) is mentioned. 
  
Importantly, HumanRights does not have a Security category because it already includes physical 
integrity. When mandates refer to protection of human rights activists/advocates, we use 
CivilSocietyAssistance_Security. We do not code protection provided to human rights officers since 
these are part of UN personnel, which we never code. 
 
ChildRights 
ChildRights refers to activities and policies designed to protect children from harm during or after armed 
conflict, including efforts to prevent recruitment of children into armed groups, to facilitate the 
reintegration of ex-child soldiers into their home communities, and to mitigate other forms of child 
abuse and neglect.  We do not code ChildRights if the paragraph only refers to girls. This is why this 
policy area does not have a specific Security category.  
 
“To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in developing and implementing programmes for 
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the 
dismantling of militias and self-defence groups, consistent with the objectives of reconciliation 
and taking into account the specific needs of demobilized children” (S/RES/2100, 2013). This 
is coded as ChildRights_Assist 
 
“To exercise good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation in support of the mission’s 
protection strategy, especially in regard to women and children, including to facilitate inter-
communal reconciliation in areas of high risk of conflict as an essential part of long-term State-
building activity;” (S/RES/2187, 2014). This is coded as ChildRights_Assist. 
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We do not code this in this category: “To contribute to the promotion and protection of human 
rights in Côte d’Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and girls, 




This is a special category of the human rights activity category. The paragraph needs to refer to sexual 
violence or gender-based violence (SGBV). If the paragraph only reports about sexual violence, do not 
code human rights. This should not include references to violations committed by UN PKO personnel. 
We infer from a reference to violence against women that the resolution is referring to gender-based 
violence. 
 
“To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including 
through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and 
address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict” 
(S/RES/2164, 2014). This is coded as SGBViolence_Assist (reference to general needs) and 
SGBViolence_Security (reference to protection). 
  
PoliceReform 
Police reform refers to reforming, restructuring and rebuilding police and other law enforcement 
institutions. This also includes instances of training programmes or coordinated operations involving 
the national police and the mission. If it is really not clear whether the agent is the police or military, 
then code under both MilitaryReform and PoliceReform. If Security Sector is mentioned and there is no 
specific reference to either police or military, then we code both police and military. We do not code 
JusticeReform unless it is specifically mentioned. Below is an example: 
 
 “To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local, 
regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, 
stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the 
prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law” (S/RES/814, 
1993). This is coded as PoliceReform_Assist. 
 
Notice that here we do not code JusticeSector because it is aimed at international humanitarian law, 
not at domestic judicial structures. Also, we code PoliceReform in combination with Reintegration in 
reference to activities where former combatants are integrated into the national police forces. When the 
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task refers to national army or generally to defense forces, we use MilitaryReform instead of 
PoliceReform (see below). 
 
MilitaryReform 
Military reform refers to reforming, restructuring and rebuilding military institutions. If it is really not 
clear whether the agent is police or military, then code under both MilitaryReform and PoliceReform. 
If Security Sector is mentioned and there is no specific reference to either police or military, then we 
code both PoliceReform and MilitaryReform.  MilitaryReform is also coded in two additional instances. 
One is when military justice is mentioned. For example, the following paragraph refers to both civilian 
and military justice system, hence we code both MilitaryReform (for the latter) and JusticeSector (for 
the former). Second, we code MilitaryReform in combination with Reintegration in reference to 
activities where former combatants are integrated into the national security forces. 
 
“Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing a military justice 
system that is complementary to the civil justice system”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as 
MilitaryReform_Assist (and JusticeSector_Assist) 
 
 
“To support the CAR Authorities in developing an approach to the vetting of defence and 
security elements (FACA, police and gendarmerie) which includes human rights vetting, in 
particular to promote accountability of violations of international and domestic law amongst 
security forces and in the context of any integration of demobilized armed groups elements into 




Offensive Operations refer to offensive interventions (e.g. attacks on non-state armed actors) by the 
PKO or another international actor. The UN Security Council must mandate the UN PKO to specifically 
use force against threats and engage in offensive operations, against rebel groups or “terrorist groups”.   
 
This category excludes patrolling (which the mission commonly carries out in most deployment areas), 
stabilization and deterrence activities. It strictly focuses on offensive actions against armed actors, and 
includes the deployment of special forces such as the Intervention Brigade in DRC. 
OffensiveOperations_Monitor: is coded if the UNSC resolutions asks the PKO to report on its offensive 
operations. OffensiveOperations_Assist is coded if the UNSC resolution asks the PKO to conduct 
offensive operations with the government forces. OffensiveOperations_Security is coded if the UNSC 
resolution asks the PKO to conduct offensive operations without government. 




“In support of the Malian authorities, to stabilize the key population centres and other areas 
where civilians are at risk, notably in the North of Mali, including through long-range 
patrols, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of 
armed elements to those areas.” (S/RES/2227, 2015). This is coded as 
OffensiveOperations_Assist. 
 
 “To deter violence against civilians, including foreign nationals, especially through proactive 
deployment, active patrolling with particular attention to displaced civilians, including those 
in protection sites and refugee.” (RES7 2187, 2014). This is coded as 
OffensiveOperation_Security. 
 
 “Requests MINUSMA, in pursuit of its relevant priority tasks and active defence of its 
mandate, to continue anticipate and deter threats and to take robust and active steps to counter 
asymmetric attacks against civilians or United Nations personnel, to ensure prompt and 
effective responses to threats of violence against civilians and to prevent a return of armed 
elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible 
threats” (S/RES/2423, 2018). This is coded as OffensiveOperation_Security. 
 
“Encourages MONUC […] to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in 
the areas where its units are deployed, to support the FARDC integrated brigades with a view 
to disarming the recalcitrant foreign and Congolese armed groups”. (S/RES/1794, 2007). 
This is coded as OffensiveOperations_Encouraged. 
 
JusticeSectorReform 
Justice sector reform compromises activities to re-establish and strengthen judicial and legal systems 
(Ministry of justice, courts, magistrates, judges, etc.). We do not code justice sector unless it is 
specifically mentioned. However, when justice sector is used in reference to military justice, this is 
coded as MilitaryReform. When no distinction is made, JusticeSectorReform is coded.  
 
“Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing a military justice 
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Transitional justice refers to efforts to hold individuals accountable for crimes committed over the 
course of an armed conflict. Transitional justice can include war crime prosecutions, truth commissions 
and reparations, among other mechanisms. Often these mechanisms are designed to operate separately 
from the rest of the justice system. Examples include the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Prosecutions by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) should also be coded here. We code reporting or monitoring on humanitarian law violations only 
if they related to explicit transitional justice mechanisms. We code TransitionalJustice_Monitor form 
this paragraph: 
  
 “Request the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with 
assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, to assist in the 
restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the 
investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian 
law.” (S/RES/814, 1993). This is coded as TransitionalJustice_Assist. We code this 
evidence for a PKO activity because the “Special Representative” is mentioned, who 
is part of the mission. We would not code this evidence if the paragraph would not 
refer to the Secretary-General. 
 
We do not code TransitionalJustice_Monitor in this paragraph: 
 
“To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-
General”. (S/RES/866, 1993). 
 
Notice that we do not code protection provided to tribunals and their personnel since these are not 
domestic actors.  
 
“Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, 
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor’s 
Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of 
humanitarian agencies in case of need”. (S/RES/997, 1993). This is coded as 
HumanitarianAssistance_Security and CivilSocietyAssistance_Security 
 
PrisonReform 
Prison reform aims at improving the conditions in domestic detention facilities (jails at local police 
stations, prisons). 
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“To help reinforce the independence of the judiciary, build the capacities, and enhance the 
effectiveness of the national judicial system as well as the effectiveness and the accountability 
of the penitentiary system”. (S/RES/2387, 2017). This is coded as PrisonReform_Assist. 
  
BorderControl 
Border control activities help states secure their borders and collect import taxes. Engagement with 
custom agents and with immigration services should most likely be coded here. 
 
“Address remaining security threats and border-related challenges: […] To monitor and deter 
the activities of militias, mercenaries and other illegal armed groups and to support the 
Government in addressing border security challenges consistent with its existing mandate to 
protect civilians, including cross-border security and other challenges in the border areas”. 
(S/RES/2162, 2014). This is coded as BordedControl_Assist and BorderControl_Security. 
 
Demining 
Demining refers to detecting and removing mines and other explosive devices. 
 
“To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in cooperation with other 
international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining 




The category refers to activities related to natural resources, including timber, rubber, oil, diamonds, 
gold, iron, and other minerals. This can also include providing or assisting security for extracting natural 
resources. In addition, providing support to the government in addressing illicit exploitation and 
smuggling of natural resources is also coded in this category 
 
” Use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal 
armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources” (S/RES/1856, 2008). This is 
coded as Resources_Monitor. 
  
StateAuthority 
State authority comprises activities aimed at re-establishing government control over the territory and 
extend government control geographically; including border demarcation. It comprises activities aimed 
at strengthening the basic administrative capacity of the state, for example, in terms of rehabilitating 
(1) infrastructure (roads, government offices, custom checkpoints); (2) or providing administrative 
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services, e.g. conducting marriages, providing birth certificates, passports and identity cards, registering 
new citizens, etc. Providing or re-establishing security (e.g. through offensive operations), however, 
should not be coded here. If the PKO is mandated to provide security for government personnel 
(ministers, head of state), then we code StateAuthority_Security. 
 
 “To support the implementation of the defence and security measures of the Agreement, 
especially its Part III and Annex 2, notably … to support the redeployment of the reformed and 
reconstituted Malian Defence and Security Forces especially (MDSF) in the Centre and North 
of Mali,” (S/RES/2295, 2016). This is coded as StateAuthority_Assist. 
 
“Decides to adjust the mandate of UNMEE, in order to assist the Boundary Commission in the 
expeditious and orderly implementation of its Delimitation Decision, to include with immediate 
effect: […] b) administrative and logistical support for the Field Offices of the Boundary 
Commission.” (S/RES/1430, 2002). This is coded as StateAuthority_Assist. 
 
“To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration 
throughout the country.” (S/RES/2100, 2013). This is coded as StateAuthority_Assist. 
 
 “To support, in coordination with the Ivorian authorities, the provision of security for the 





Democratizations refers to activities for strengthening democratic institutions and building capacity of 
elected representatives in terms of making them more accountable and responsive to citizens. Examples 
of democratic institutions might include the parliament, the office of the ombudsman, parliamentary 
committees, etc. Anti-corruption efforts targeting elected representatives in democratic institutions 
should be coded here. If the mandate refers to political institutions generally, then we do not code it as 
Democratization. 
 
“Provide advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at the 
national, provincial, regional and local levels” (S/RES/1756, 2007). This is coded as 
Democratization_Assist. 
 
“[…] with a particular emphasis on strengthening democratic institutions” (S/RES/1906, 
2009). This is coded as Democratization_Assist. 





 “Contribute to the promotion of good governance and respect for the principle of 
accountability”.  (S/RES/1756, 2007). This is not coded because too vague. 
 
“Decides that the mandate of UNMISS shall be to consolidate peace and security, and to help 
establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to 
strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern 
effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours, and 
accordingly authorizes UNMISS to perform the following tasks;… Promoting popular 
participation in political processes, including through advising and supporting the Government 
of the Republic of South Sudan on an inclusive constitutional process”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). 
We do not code this because it is not aimed directly at specific democratic institutions and 
the first part does not actually authorize the mission to do something. 
  
ElectoralSecurity 
Electoral security activities refer to activities to protect voters, candidates and election workers as well 
as the integrity of the election process (or referendum), e.g. election material and infrastructure, from 
physical attacks. We code electoral security monitoring if the PK is mandated to investigate / monitor / 
follow-up … activities “leading up to elections”. We do not code ElectoralSecurity_Security and code 
both (1) assisting the government in providing security for elections or (2) providing security for 
elections as ElectoralSecurity_Assist because it is usually impossible to infer whether or not the 
government was involved. 
 
“To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government’s 




Election assistance refers to activities to assist the organization of free and fair elections beyond 
electoral security (assisting peaceful elections). Referendums on independence (e.g. Western Sahara 
and South Sudan) can be coded here, too. If the PKO is mandated to verify and certify an election (as 
UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire or UNAVEM in Angola), then we code this under 
ElectionAssistance_Monitor. We do not code ElectoralAssistance_Security because it basically codes 
the same as ElectoralSecurity_Assist.  
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“The conduct of a limited but reliable international observation of the first and second rounds 
of the legislative elections” (S/RES/1201, 1998). This is coded as ElectoralAssistance_Assist. 
 
VoterEducation 
Activities that relate to informing voters and candidates on the modalities of the elections and on the 
importance of fair and peaceful behaviour. 
 
“Notes with appreciation the ongoing support provided by the Public Information Section of 
UNAMSIL to the National Electoral Commission in designing and implementing a civic 
education and public information strategy, and encourages UNAMSIL to continue these 
efforts”. (S/RES/1389, 2002). This is coded as VoterEducation_Encouraged. 
  
PoliticalPartyAssistance 
Political party assistance refers to support for political parties and former armed groups to become 
professional, efficient and effective organizations. 
 
“To provide good offices and mediation between the Government and political parties;” 
(S/RES/1159, 1998). This is coded as PoliticalPartyAssistance_Assist. 
  
CivilSocietyAssistance 
Civil society assistance refers to support for domestic civil society organizations to more efficiently and 
effectively represent citizens' needs and to control government behaviour. Civil society organizations 
are often also called NGOs, women’s groups, youth groups, human rights defenders (which would also 
be coded in the Human Rights category), etc. In any case, the targeted civil society needs to have some 
degree of organization so that we can code the evidence as CivilSocietyAssistance. 
CivilSocietyAssistance is not used when there are vague references to widening popular support or 
popular participation. We do not code CivilSocietyAssistance if the UNSC resolution only refers to 
“sectors of society”.  We always code CivilSocietyAssistance if the UN PKO is mandated to coordinate 
or engage in any way with organized civil society. 
 
Notice also that CivilSocietyAssistance_Security is coded when the mission is mandated to protect 
human rights activists/advocates (but not UN human rights officers). 
 
Media 
The category "media" covers economic, technical, and financial assistance to build and strengthen and 
provide independent domestic media. 
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“[A]uthorizes UNMISS to perform the following tasks: […] promoting the establishment of 
an independent media”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as Media_Assist. 
 
PublicInfo 
The category describes activities by the PKO to inform residents in its host country about the mission’s 
activities, the peace process and other political relevant events. This excludes voter education 
campaigns (for which we have a separate category).  
 
“Welcomes the UNMISS initiative to launch an outreach campaign throughout the 
country, and encourages the Mission within existing resources to further develop its 
communication with local communities to improve understanding of the Mission’s 
mandate” (S/RES/2057, 2012). This is coded as PublicInfo_Encourage. Notice we do 
not code ‘welcomes’ here, but only ‘encourages’ 
 
 “To develop appropriate public information activities in support of the UN activities 
in Somalia” (S/RES/814, 1993). This is coded as PublicInfo_Assist. 
 
PowerSharing 
Power-sharing refers to any arrangement that divides political power between former belligerents or 
stakeholders in the peace process. This can include coalitions of national unity; power-sharing within 
specific state institutions (e.g. the military); geographic forms of power-sharing (e.g. establishment of 
autonomous regions); etc. We do not have examples of this in our current sample. 
  
Reconciliation 
Reconciliation means fostering dialogue between people from different communities and bringing them 
together to discuss their differences in a peaceful environment. Often the resolution refers to building 
social cohesion and national unity or to “good offices” in relation to reconciliation activities. Nation-
wide reconciliation follows under this category (see below for more local initiatives). 
 
“To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their 
functioning” (S/RES/1270, 1999). This is coded as Reconciliation_Assist. 
 
“Commends the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for her good offices efforts 
and political support and requests that such important efforts and support continue, in 
particular with a view to the presidential election to be held in October 2015, in line with 
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paragraph 19 (b) of this resolution”. (S/RES/2226, 2015). This is coded as 
Reconciliation_Assist. 
 
“Requests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to continue to use her good 
offices role including to facilitate dialogue between all political stakeholders”. (S/RES/2112, 
2013). This is coded as Reconciliation_Assist. 
 
LocalReconciliation 
Local reconciliation refers to reconciliation activities that involves local communities, including local 
traditional authorities. These initiatives include local conflict resolution, local peacebuilding, 
strengthening confidence and trust among communities.  
 
“Exercising good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation at the national, state, and 
county levels within capabilities to anticipate, prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict”. 
(S/RES/1996, 2011). This is coded as LocalReconciliation_Assist. 
 
RegionalReconciliation 
Regional reconciliation refers to reconciliation activities that involve neighbouring states. These 
initiatives include mandated task of the UN PKO to convene regional conference, mediate between 




“To continue to play a role as observer with UNAMID in the Contact Group that was 
established under the 13 March 2008 Dakar Accord to monitor its implementation and assist, 
as necessary, the Governments of Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic to build 




Economic development refers to activities to restore the economy and financial situation of the country. 
This includes mandates to acquire funding for economic development and reconstruction. Do only code 
this category if the report uses the word “economic”, “financial”, “economic restoration, economic 
reconstruction or very similar terms. As already mentioned, we do not code early recovery as 
EconomicDevelopment, unless there is more explicit evidence for this.  
“Urgently requests the Government to develop in close coordination with MONUC, as a 
matter of priority as part of its effort to extend its authority throughout the Democratic 
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Republic of the Congo, a plan to ensure security in the eastern part of the country, 
particularly by carrying out the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation or resettlement, as 
appropriate, and reintegration of foreign and Congolese combatants, and by promoting 
national reconciliation, recovery and development in the region”. (S/RES/1756, 2007). 
Among other fields (e.g. DDR), this is also coded as EconomicDevelopment_Assist. 
 
“[E]ncourages UNAMID, within its current mandate, to facilitate the work of the UN 
Country Team and expert agencies on early recovery and reconstruction in Darfur, inter alia 
through the provision of area security”. (S/RES/1935, 2010). This is coded as 
EconomicDevelopment_Encourages and EconomicDevelopment_Security. 
 
 “Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate 
the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and 
agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers”. 
(S/RES/1029, 1995). This is not coded due to the general reference to development.  
 
“Request the SG to seek, as appropriate, pledges and contributions from States and others to 
assist in financing the rehabilitation of the political institution and economy of Somalia.” 
(S/RES/814, 1993). This is not coded. 
  
HumanitarianRelief 
Humanitarian relief refers to intervention in emergency situations and humanitarian crises, such as 
natural disaster relief as well as responses to short-term man-made disasters. Notice that 
HumanitarianRelief also includes humanitarian aid. We always code HumanitarianRelief_Assist if the 
PKO is mandated to assist the delivery of humanitarian aid. We do not code HumanitarianRelief_Assist 
but do code HumanitarianRelief_Security if the PKO is only mandated to assist the delivery of aid by 
providing security (but not with logistical support).  
 
 “… including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure 
humanitarian areas…”. (S/RES/929, 1994). We code this as HumanitarianRelief_Security. 
 
 
 “Support the provision of humanitarian aid”. (S/RES/997, 1995). We code this as 
HumanitarianRelief_Assist. 
 
“To continue to facilitate unhindered humanitarian access and to help strengthening the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations, notably 
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by contributing to enhance security conducive to this delivery” (S/RES/2000, 2011). We code 
this as HumanitarianRelief_Assist. 
 
This other example from MINUSCA is not coded because it refers to coordination on 
international assistance, not clearly humanitarian: 
 




Public health refers to activities aimed at preventing or addressing the consequences of endemic 
diseases, e.g. Ebola, cholera, HIV/AIDS, etc. 
“To coordinate with UNMEER, as appropriate”. (S/RES/2215, 2015). This is coded as 
PublicHealth_Assist, UNMEER was the Ebola Emergency Response mission in Liberia. 
 
RefugeeAssistance 
Refugee assistance includes the creation, management and maintenance of refugee and IDP camps, as 
well as the provision of assistance for returnees. This can include assistance to the government to ratify 
or/and implement treaties on refugee assistance.  While for the category of HumanitarianRelief the 
phase “creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian relief” can ONLY mean 
Humanitarianrelief_Security, for the category “RefugeeAssistance”, the phrease creating conditions 
conducive to the return of refugees and IDPs can be both refugeeAssistance_Assist and 
RefugeeAssistance_Security because the UN PKO can help refugee return through services other than 
providing security, e.g. building houses. 
 
 “Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, 
to this end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of 
confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks”. (S/RES/997, 1995).  This is 
coded as RefugeeAssistance_Assist and RefugeeAssistance_Monitor. 
 
 “Support government effort… to create an environment conducive to voluntary, safe and 
dignified return”. (S/RES/1925, 2010). This is coded as RefugeeAssistance_Assist and 
RefugeeAssistance_Security. 
 
“In support of Malian authorities, to contribute to creation of secure environment for safe, 
civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance […] and the voluntary, safe, and dignified return 
[…] of IDP and refugees”. (S/RES/2164, 2014). This is coded as RefugeeAssistance_Security. 








Gender refers to gender mainstreaming in the activities, policies and approaches of international 
actors. It means that the PKO promotes equality between men and women, including empowerment of 
women. This can include assistance to the government to ratify or/and implement treaties on women’s 
rights. This can also include meetings with women’s representatives. We do not code Gender if the 
resolution only mentions women as one among other targets of physical protection efforts or as 
example of especially vulnerable groups of persons. For example, we code child soldiers under 
ChildRights but do not code Gender for women combatants. This is an example for Gender_Assist 
because it refers to human rights treaties that enshrine gender equality.  
 
“Encourages the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to ratify and implement key 
international human rights treaties and conventions, including those related to women and 
children, refugees, and statelessness, and requests UNMISS, with other United Nations 
actors, to advise and assist the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in this regard;” 
(S/RES/2057, 2012). This is coded as Gender_Assist (but also HumanRights_Assist and 
ChildRights_Assist). 
 
This is an example for NOT coding Gender_Assist because it refers to physical protection rather than 
equality between men and women:  
 
“To exercise good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation in support of the mission’s 
protection strategy, especially in regard to women.” (S/RES/2187, 2014). This is not 
coded as Gender. 
 
This is also an example for not coding Gender because it refers to women as category of combatants 
(but notice that we code ChildRights_Assist here):  
 
“Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing and implementing 
a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy, in cooperation with 
international partners with particular attention to the special needs of women and child 
combatants”. (S/RES/1996, 2011). This is not coded as Gender. 
 
LegalReform 
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Legal reform refers to activities whereby international actors become involved in law-making 
processes. This category does NOT include assistance by international actors in formulating 
"regulations" or "policies" that do not have the force of law. Cue words to distinguish laws from other 
policies are legislation, law, legislative process, constitutional process, act, draft act, parliament, etc 
 
“To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the 
Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an 
independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United 
Nations agencies”. (S/RES/1778, 2007). This is coded as LegalReform_Assist. 
  
Ceasefire 
Ceasefire refers to peacekeepers or other international actors’ engagement for agreements between 
belligerents to stop the fighting (e.g. attacking each other on the ground, by air strikes, etc.). If the 
resolution states that the PKO is mandated to monitor the (peace) process with the goal of getting to a 
ceasefire agreement, we only code Ceasefire and do not code PeaceProcess. The example text below 
is evidence for coding Ceasefire_Assist because the peacekeeping mission is tasked with assisting the 
Somali parties to respect the ceasefire. 
 
 “Assisting the Somali parties in implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements", in particular in 
their cooperative efforts to achieve disarmament and to respect the cease-fire” (S/RES/ 897, 
1994). This is coded as Ceasefire_Assist. 
 
Examples of Ceasefire_Security involve deterring and preventing hostile action in the areas where the 
ceasefire is being implemented.  
 
“To observe and monitor the implementation of the joint declaration of the end of the war of 
6 April 2005 and of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, to prevent, within 
its capabilities and its areas of deployment, any hostile action, in particular within the Zone 
of Confidence, and to investigate violations of the ceasefire” (S/RES/1609, 2005). This is 
coded as Ceasefire_Monitor and Ceasefire_Security. 
 
PeaceProcess (essentially PeaceAgreement) 
Peace process refers to any international engagement for reaching a peace agreement (not a ceasefire) 
between belligerent parties. We only code this category if the paragraph clearly refers to the process of 
getting to a peace agreement. Key words are “peace agreement” and “peace process”. Thus, the example 
text from UNSOM II 897 for coding Ceasefire_Assist is not evidence for coding PeaceProcess_Assist 
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because it deals with the implementation of the Peace Agreement (Addis Ababa Agreements) and not 
with getting / maintaining it.  
 
 “Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with 
the OAU and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political 
settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;” 
(S/RES/918, 1994). This is coded as PeaceAgreement_Encouraged. 
 
 “To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-
compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of 
the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon 
as appropriate to the Secretary-General;” (S/RES/872, 1993). This is not coded because it 




The variable UseOfForce reflects the authorization of using of all necessary means. The mentioning of 
a Chapter VII mandate is not enough to code UseOfForce. The use of force can be mandated for self-
defense or for defense of the mandate. It would be good to distinguish the two in the comment section. 
References to Chapter VII are not sufficient to code UseOfForce. Examples are: 
 
• Underscores the importance of MONUC implementing its mandate in full, 
including through robust rules of engagement. (S/RES/1843, 2008). 
• Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that 
MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry 
battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities. (S/RES/1313, 2000). 
• To deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by 
responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of 
force. (S/RES/1313, 2000). 
• Authorizes MONUSCO, in pursuit of the objectives described in paragraph 3 
above, to take all necessary measures to perform the following tasks. (S/RES/2147, 
2014). 
• Underscores that UNMISS’ protection of civilians mandate as set out in paragraph 
3 (b) (v) of resolution 1996 (2011) includes taking the necessary actions to protect 
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civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of 
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